Venezuela’s ‘NO’ and Bolivia's Uncertainty

Here's the question that a half dozen foreign journalists have asked me in the last two days, a reasonable one: What will be the effect in Bolivia, of Venezuela's Sunday vote turning down President Hugo Chavez’s new constitution? Will it embolden the Bolivian opposition? Will it weaken the constitutional reform efforts by MAS and Morales? Will it move things toward compromise or toward deeper conflict?

Making predictions in Bolivia is never easy, and recent events here have made it more difficult still. There is the 'doomsday scenario', in which the country dissolves into violent conflict. There is the 'suddenly they work it out' scenario, in which MAS and the opposition hammer out some sort of compromise. And there are many other scenarios that fall somewhere in between. At this point, anything seems possible.

Today was supposed to be the day that Morales and the Governors (the real opposition here) were going to get together in La Paz to talk. But instead, five of the Governors are headed to the U.S. to make a formal complaint before the Organization of American States, and Morales' aides are preparing their own version of events to present to the OAS as well. It seems that both sides care a good deal how they come off in foreign eyes.

As MAS and its opponents ready their public cases about why the other is to blame for the recent violence, here are a few observations about where things stand:

The Opposition's Next Move: Let the Constituent Assembly Fail

Legally, if December 14 comes and goes, with neither an extension from the Congress nor a Constitution approved by 2/3 of the Assembly, Bolivia's Constituent Assembly will be dead. From a purely political point of view, I am certain that is exactly what the opposition here wants.

Blocking progress in the Assembly seems to have been the opposition's modus operandi from the start, and its failure now would serve the opposition on three levels all at once. First, it removes their fear of a new Bolivian Constitution primarily crafted by MAS. Second, it deals a heavy political blow to President Morales. Third, the Assembly's official failure is likely to enflame and radicalize MAS and its backers – a move that will certainly further deliver urban and middle class Bolivians into the opposition's welcoming arms.

Working out some sort of compromise is a better thing for Bolivia. There are critical issues contained in the Constitution – recognition of the nation's indigenous peoples, the laying out of basic rights, and more – that ought to be in the nation's primary legal document. There are also plenty of these issues where a consensus or reasonable compromise is possible. It would also be a valuable thing for Bolivia to find a way forward based on some sense of national unity, instead of heading down an uncertain path of national anger. But politics trumps patriotism and even if MAS and Morales were to change course and offer a serious hand toward reconciliation, it is hard to imagine a scenario now in which the opposition would move to save the Assembly.

MAS and Morales: Confusing Social Justice with Consolidating Power

There is another root of the conflict that has to be put on the table. In Venezuela and Bolivia alike, some supporters of Chavez and of Morales have confused the important cause of advancing social justice with the partisan cause of consolidating political power into their own hands. These two causes are not the same things.

Reacting to the Venezuela vote, some Chavez defenders have blamed the NO vote's narrow win (51% to 49%) on low-turnout by Chavez supporters among the nation’s poor, “…because they did not either understand or accept that this was a necessary referendum.” But it didn’t take journalists in Caracas too much digging to find people, poor people, who eagerly support Chavez's moves to share the nation's oil wealth but who aren't keen on his aims to stay in office for life.

To be certain, the heart of what is happening here in Bolivia is about a social movement, which dates back long before Morales' Presidency, for social justice and economic equality. Nevertheless, if one travels beyond the circles of political activists, it isn't hard to find people who support MAS and Morales in their drive for fairness and justice but who are also none too happy about changes like unlimited Presidential re-election. In fact, it isn't hard to find those same complaints and concerns among social movement activists.

It is a dangerously common thing for political leaders to confuse national interest with their desire for more power. George Bush wants to eliminate checks against torture and spying, in the name of "protecting us against terrorism". Hugo Chavez hoped to stand for lifelong re-election and to assume new emergency powers, in the name of delivering a socialist state dedicated to the needs of the neediest. In Bolivia, where every adult over the age of 40 has lived first hand under dictatoship, the MAS and Morales moves to "consolidate power" have struck a nerve and given the opposition free political fuel.

What to Watch for Next

What will happen in Bolivia next?

For the next few days watch for leaders of every stripe wrapping themselves in the banner of "democracy". It is a word that has been used here to defend everything from burning public buildings (by both sides) to blocking highways (both sides again). Bolivian history buffs will note the irony, for example, of opposition leader Jorge Quiroga traveling about the region as a defender of Bolivian democracy – ommiting the fact that he eagerly served as Vice President to a former dictaor, General Hugo Banzer.

Eventually the Governors will come back from their trek to Washington and the question will be, once again, will the Governors and Morales meet and will they find a compromise way forward.

In the meantime, the other issue is how these issues will play out on the streets as the politicians talk. Cochabamba, I believe, is the city to watch. In Santa Cruz there will be hunger strikes and probably more marches, but crowds there are lopsidely loyal to the opposition so conflict is unlikely. The reverse is true in La Paz and El Alto, with loyalty there to Morales and MAS. Sucre, now that it no longer hosts a Constituent Assembly, will cease to be the center of attention. Cochabamba, on the other hand, is where the two sides meet in roughly equal numbers, and as we saw in January, when both sides occupy the streets together, the possibilities are volatile.

The next step in the streets will be here on Thursday afternoon. Social movements, labor groups, and coca growers have called for a march to defend the demand for a new Constitution, and to remind all sides that it is demand larger than the political parties now dominating the process.