Let's Play Bolivian Political Chess

Game metaphors abound this week as political junkies and journalists try to sort out the blockbuster announcement of recall elections in August for the eleven most powerful elected officials in Bolivia.

In my Friday post I called it poker, and it is, all chips pushed out on the table. There has been some effort to find a good soccer metaphor in all of this, because it is Bolivia after all. But the game that really fits at this point is chess. A high stakes game of chess in which, if the political actors involved haven’t looked a good four to five moves ahead, they aren’t very smart.

Not that I’m very smart, but I do like politics, so lets have a guess at some scenarios.

First, let’s talk about whose political futures are really in play. Up front I will confess that I have no where near the knowledge needed to make educated guesses about what happens to the Governors in Tarija, the Beni, Potosi, Oruro, Chuquisaca, or the Pando. I’ll let others guess at that. And Santa Cruz seems like a slam dunk win for Ruben Costas.

So, let’s talk about three very ambitious politicians in Bolivia who do have their heads in the political guillotine in August – Evo Morales, Manfred Ryes Villa, and José Luis Paredes.

Starting with Evo, remember, to oust Morales from office his adversaries have to rack up two things: a percentage vote against him of 54% of those who vote and a total vote of at least 1.544.375. One of those milestones alone won’t do it. My guess is that the battleground over Evo takes place in three departments.

In La Paz, Evo will try turn the heavy tide of anti-Santa Cruz sentiment into a vote in his favor even higher than the 67% of the vote he got in 2005. Hmmm, maybe. In Santa Cruz civic leaders will aim to pile on new votes against Evo that can help cancel out his support elsewhere. But he only has to win 33% in his favor there to hold his position steady from 2005. So it likely comes down to Cochabamba, where Morales’ 65% win in 2005 is going to be hard to match without him winning back a large number of the urban middle class voters he has lost since his election.

But do keep in mind, anytime you see a public opinion poll in Bolivia tracking Evo’s popularity, you can reasonably assume it is utterly inaccurate. These polls are almost always urban-centered and miss Evo’s formidable support in the countryside.

Second, we come to Manfred, who has to keep the vote against him under 48% and under 246,417 votes. I’ll take pretty much any bet that Manfred wins, mainly because he will do anything he has to do be sure he does. The former Cochabamba Mayor’s political career is marked by two highlights. When he runs in Cochabamba he is a powerhouse and when he sticks his nose into national politics he is inept (joining with Goni after Febrero Negro was like buying tickets on the Titanic after it hit the iceberg). In a new Cochabamba fight, he’ll win.

Do take note, however, that MAS’ second major objective, the first being Evo’s continuation as President, will be to dispense with Manfred. Evo and Manfred hate each other, enough to unleash January 11, 2007, and they share a political backyard. That is a recipe for political warfare.

[Note to reporters: When you come to freezing Bolivia in July to cover the race, come to Cochabamba. Both the campaign and the weather will be hotter.]

And finally Paredes, the Governor of La Paz (a.k.a. ‘Pepe Lucho’). It will take only 38% of the voters to oust him, against the backdrop of a Morales vote there in 2005 of 67%. Those aren’t happy odds for any politician to face. If Paredes survives the vote (and he could) then he should be officially recognized as both the most capable and the luckiest campaigner in the nation.

So that is how it looks headed toward the August vote. But good chess players should have looked well beyond August. Imagine this scenario for example:

Evo loses, say with 45% supporting him, 55% against. Does he run in the replacement election 90 days later? You bet he does. Does the opposition split into its usual encampments of ambition? Yup. Among those who would likely run – Ryes Villa, Jorge Quiroga, Samuel Doria Medina, former Army head Alvin Anaya, and at least a surprise or two (Carlos Mesa?) all from Evo’s right. Does Evo finish first, but with less than 51%? Pretty likely. Who decides the election? The Bolivian Congress, which will have the same political complexion as today – MAS control of the lower house and MAS in need of just one additional vote in the Senate. Who has that vote? Samuel Doria Medina and the UN party.

A Morales/Medina governing coalition?

Okay, that completes my personal capacity for political speculation. Now let’s get to the business of seeing what Bolivians have to ay about all this, those that aren’t politicians and political junkies. That’s where the Blog is headed next.

But meanwhile, a little something extra:

Advice to Evo: Five Things You Can do to Enhance Your Chances of Winning

1. "Dear Hugo, As a favor, from now until August, if you do happen to mention Bolivia, just comment on how good the pique is in Cochabamba and leave it at that. Yours, Evo."

2. Get former U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha to come back and denounce you, as he did in the run up to the 2002 vote. For extra points, get Ambassador Goldberg to stand next to him with some boxes of ammo marked USAID.

3. Get married, to one of Las Magnificas. Have the wedding in Santa Cruz. Invite everyone in the department to attend. Don't run out of beer until day three.

4. Run full-page ads in all the Sunday dailies denouncing you, but make them look like they were paid for by Goni. Be sure to run Goni's picture with them, the one where Manfred is at his side.

5. Get your picture taken as often as possible with small children and puppies.