Is the United States Funding Violent Opposition Groups in Bolivia?
Dear Readers:Earlier this week I received an article in my e-mail from a U.S. organization whose research work I generally respect a good deal, the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). CEPR is a prolific producer of research and commentary on a wide range of economic issues, and from time to time it writes about events in Bolivia.
The article in my in-box was titled, The Fun House Mirror: Distortions and Omissions in the News on Bolivia, and was published by the solid NACLA Reporter. But what caught my eye in the CEPR article was this declaration:
"Just a day before the [September 2008 Pando] massacre, at the height of opposition violence, the Bolivian government expelled U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg, following revelations that the U.S. Embassy in La Paz had asked Peace Corps volunteers and a Fulbright scholar to spy inside Bolivia, together with growing evidence, amid official secrecy, of U.S. funding for violent opposition groups [emphasis added]. "
The debate over what the U.S. government is and is not funding in Bolivia and with what actual intent has been hotly debated, especially since President Morales declared in 2007 that USAID was directly funding efforts to undermine his government. The U.S. Embassy and organizations such as USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) insist that they are merely supporting efforts to strengthen government administration. Critics, in both Bolivia and the U.S. have charged these U.S. enterprises with directly trying to topple Morales.
Nevertheless, the charge by CEPR seemed to go a good deal farther, "… growing evidence, amid official secrecy, of U.S. funding for violent opposition groups."
I wrote to the article's author, Dan Beeton. I told him that I have heard plenty of evidence that recipients of USAID and NED funding are involved in activities such as writing anti-Evo opinion articles in newspapers and the like, but had yet to see convincing evidence that the U.S. was directly funding "violent opposition groups." The footnote in the article on that point, instead of offering such documentation, led only back to another CEPR news release. In response, Dan wrote back that there was plenty of evidence to back the charge, and I invited him to present it here on the Blog.
I think this is a very important debate, and one which needs to be argued out based on the facts and with evidence not just charges. I don't agree with all the points in his analysis, but I do hope that Dan Beeton's correspondence below will help provoke a solid and intelligent debate among our readers on this issue. In addition, I am inviting both the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and the NED to draft any response they would be willing to offer on this topic and have offered to publish it here, unedited, as I am doing with Dan Beeton's analysis below.
I look forward to your comments.
Jim Shultz
Is the United States Funding Violent Opposition Groups in Bolivia?
Written by Dan Beeton, Center for Economic and Policy Research
There's a fair amount of evidence that the U.S. has already funded violent actors among the Bolivian opposition, even from the relatively little that we know about recent grants through USAID and so on:We know that since President Morales’ election, the U.S. government has sent millions of dollars in aid to departmental prefects and municipal governments in Bolivia. See e.g.:
USAID DATA Sheet: Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report
"OTI has approved 101 grants for $4,066,131 to help departmental governments operate more strategically." We know that Leopoldo Fernandez, as a prefect, received some of this money. As you know, he is not someone who has merely written "anti-Evo op.eds," he was found by the UNASUR commission that investigated the September violence in Porvenir to have led a "chain of command” of perpetrators who acted "in an organized fashion” to commit a "massacre."
From the "USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report July - September 2006": "OTI activities are aimed at building the capacity of prefect-led departmental governments to help them better respond to the constituencies they govern.…During the third quarter, OTI has continued to build on its activities designed to enhance the capacity of departmental governments. OTI isimplementing projects in coordination with all nine departmental governments, most recently collaborating with the prefectures of Beni,Pando, and Oruro. The projects provide technical support and training for prefecture staff in the areas of strategic planning, budgeting andproject management. They also build institutional capacity related to financial and administrative systems, transparency mechanisms,communications and outreach. In addition, OTI approved new projects designed to help prefectures more efficiently and strategicallyapproach their responsibilities in regional economic development, departmental infrastructure and social services.”
We also know that USAID has similarly funded and worked with Ruben Costas in his capacity as prefect of Santa Cruz. To take one example, again from the "USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report July - September 2006":
“During the third quarter, OTI approved a total of 24 projects for $913,000. Thirteen of the new projects, totaling $465,800, are being implemented in support of the decentralization process through strengthened departmental governments. One newly-approved set of activities in the departments of Pando, Tarija, Potosí and Santa Cruz will facilitate the transparent, efficient flow of information between the various offices and divisions within prefectures. Its goal is to improve communication between departmental governments and stakeholders
at the local government and community levels.”
Ruben Costas has most recently been in the news again after witnesses told prosecutor Marcelo Sosa that Costas had offered “a house and land” to Eduardo Rozsa Flores and the other plotters in the terrorist cell broken up by Bolivian authorities on April 16, 2009. Whether this accusation turns out to be true or not, I would argue that Costas has clearly supported violence against both the Bolivian government and indigenous people in Bolivia in other ways.
Costas made numerous statements supporting the violence as it unfolded in September 2008. On September 9, 2008, the Andean Information Network reported that “In response to the day’s violence, Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas claimed that these outbursts reflected the 86% of people in his prefect who voted for departmental autonomy.” Costas did not mince his words, according to AIN: “This is not a coup d’état, nor a civic-prefectural coup,” but rather a response “to the violence and repression of a fascist Government.”[. . .]“What happened today in Santa Cruz is the consequence of State terrorism that the government exercises, of the blindness that impedes them from recognizing the peoples’ right, the free determination and sovereignty of the departmental autonomy.”
Costas has also stirred up racial hatred by calling Morales “a monkey,” which is not trivial considering the ongoing racial violence against indigenous Bolivians by the UJC, Camba Nation, and various other groups.
Was Phillip Goldberg really surprised to be expelled after being caught having a clandestine meeting with this man?
I noted some of the prefects' encouragement of the September violence and sabotage in my article, citing AFP: “the conservative governors are . . . encouraging the protesters in their actions” and “Militants linked to the opposition group set up road blocks to add pressure to the governors' demands for more control over gas revenues.”
We know - if Inter Press Service's report of September 4, 2008 (referenced in my article) is correct, that the August/September 2008 violence was a planned campaign engineered by the CONALDE, which, as you know, includes “five provincial governors, business associations, conservative civic groups, and legislators of the rightwing Podemos party led by former president Jorge Quiroga.” Funding of anyone in CONALDE is the same as the funding of violent groups, when they're the ones coordinating campaigns of violence.
We also know that the NED has given money to the Santa Cruz Chamber of Commerce (CAINCO) (this is one grant that Jeremy Bigwood was able to get hold of). The Chamber has been tied to violent groups such as “the Movement for the Liberation of the Camba Nation" in press reports, and the Santa Cruz Civic Committee. (This 2005 article in Mercopress also quoted the head of the Chamber as promoting secessionism: “What we should do is simply and smoothly separate ourselves from Bolivia.") It's significant, I think, that the press was reporting these connections back in 2005 before Morales was elected. While the NED grant that Jeremy retrieved was from 2004, one would certainly hope that connections to the "Camba Nation" and such groups would make the NED and any other US-based group or government agency reconsider giving more funds to CAINCOS.
So, in short, of course I'm not suggesting that the U.S. is funding the UJC, the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, or any similar such groups directly. And I'm not saying there's evidence that the U.S. gave money to people like Fernandez to be used for violent ends. But they've nevertheless given money to prefects like Fernandez, Costas and other actors who have conspired to commit violence and have encouraged violence when it occurred, and who in all likelihood passed money on to the guys with baseball bats and guns.
This was one reason I wanted to write this article - to make clear to readers that there sometimes isn't much difference between the "respectable" opposition figures like Marinkovic and some of the prefects, and the UJC and their ilk. But despite that Reuters, AFP, and Inter Press have described the ways in which these groups are connected and they've worked together in a coordinated fashion, this still is not reported as a central part of the narrative in most U.S. press reports
It is possible that USAID et al have cut off funding to violent actors in Bolivia, that the funding of these groups was only before they became increasingly nasty last autumn. But we don't know this due to ongoing U.S. government secrecy, despite Obama's pledges of increased transparency. Whether or not all the grant recipients "need" this money from the U.S., I don't know, but the fact is that departmental and municipal governments have been receiving it. For details, I would consult with Jeremy Bigwood - he probably has more documentation on all this than anyone, and he can update you on the latest FOIA's that USAID declines to respond to.
“During the third quarter, OTI approved a total of 24 projects for $913,000. Thirteen of the new projects, totaling $465,800, are being implemented in support of the decentralization process through strengthened departmental governments. One newly-approved set of activities in the departments of Pando, Tarija, Potosí and Santa Cruz will facilitate the transparent, efficient flow of information between the various offices and divisions within prefectures. Its goal is to improve communication between departmental governments and stakeholders
at the local government and community levels.”
Ruben Costas has most recently been in the news again after witnesses told prosecutor Marcelo Sosa that Costas had offered “a house and land” to Eduardo Rozsa Flores and the other plotters in the terrorist cell broken up by Bolivian authorities on April 16, 2009. Whether this accusation turns out to be true or not, I would argue that Costas has clearly supported violence against both the Bolivian government and indigenous people in Bolivia in other ways.
Costas made numerous statements supporting the violence as it unfolded in September 2008. On September 9, 2008, the Andean Information Network reported that “In response to the day’s violence, Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas claimed that these outbursts reflected the 86% of people in his prefect who voted for departmental autonomy.” Costas did not mince his words, according to AIN: “This is not a coup d’état, nor a civic-prefectural coup,” but rather a response “to the violence and repression of a fascist Government.”[. . .]“What happened today in Santa Cruz is the consequence of State terrorism that the government exercises, of the blindness that impedes them from recognizing the peoples’ right, the free determination and sovereignty of the departmental autonomy.”
Costas has also stirred up racial hatred by calling Morales “a monkey,” which is not trivial considering the ongoing racial violence against indigenous Bolivians by the UJC, Camba Nation, and various other groups.
Was Phillip Goldberg really surprised to be expelled after being caught having a clandestine meeting with this man?
I noted some of the prefects' encouragement of the September violence and sabotage in my article, citing AFP: “the conservative governors are . . . encouraging the protesters in their actions” and “Militants linked to the opposition group set up road blocks to add pressure to the governors' demands for more control over gas revenues.”
We know - if Inter Press Service's report of September 4, 2008 (referenced in my article) is correct, that the August/September 2008 violence was a planned campaign engineered by the CONALDE, which, as you know, includes “five provincial governors, business associations, conservative civic groups, and legislators of the rightwing Podemos party led by former president Jorge Quiroga.” Funding of anyone in CONALDE is the same as the funding of violent groups, when they're the ones coordinating campaigns of violence.
We also know that the NED has given money to the Santa Cruz Chamber of Commerce (CAINCO) (this is one grant that Jeremy Bigwood was able to get hold of). The Chamber has been tied to violent groups such as “the Movement for the Liberation of the Camba Nation" in press reports, and the Santa Cruz Civic Committee. (This 2005 article in Mercopress also quoted the head of the Chamber as promoting secessionism: “What we should do is simply and smoothly separate ourselves from Bolivia.") It's significant, I think, that the press was reporting these connections back in 2005 before Morales was elected. While the NED grant that Jeremy retrieved was from 2004, one would certainly hope that connections to the "Camba Nation" and such groups would make the NED and any other US-based group or government agency reconsider giving more funds to CAINCOS.
So, in short, of course I'm not suggesting that the U.S. is funding the UJC, the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, or any similar such groups directly. And I'm not saying there's evidence that the U.S. gave money to people like Fernandez to be used for violent ends. But they've nevertheless given money to prefects like Fernandez, Costas and other actors who have conspired to commit violence and have encouraged violence when it occurred, and who in all likelihood passed money on to the guys with baseball bats and guns.
This was one reason I wanted to write this article - to make clear to readers that there sometimes isn't much difference between the "respectable" opposition figures like Marinkovic and some of the prefects, and the UJC and their ilk. But despite that Reuters, AFP, and Inter Press have described the ways in which these groups are connected and they've worked together in a coordinated fashion, this still is not reported as a central part of the narrative in most U.S. press reports
It is possible that USAID et al have cut off funding to violent actors in Bolivia, that the funding of these groups was only before they became increasingly nasty last autumn. But we don't know this due to ongoing U.S. government secrecy, despite Obama's pledges of increased transparency. Whether or not all the grant recipients "need" this money from the U.S., I don't know, but the fact is that departmental and municipal governments have been receiving it. For details, I would consult with Jeremy Bigwood - he probably has more documentation on all this than anyone, and he can update you on the latest FOIA's that USAID declines to respond to.
Response to Comments: May 12, 2009
This is a response to the few more reasonable comments questioning what I wrote. There are some racist, hate-mongering comments that don’t deserve a response, and others that are off-topic.
Some of the comments have suggested I’m making accusations or insinuations that I’m not. My points in my note to Jim, as posted above, are simply this:
1). The U.S. government has given funds to, and worked with, people such as Leopoldo Fernandez and Ruben Costas in the past. (Highlights of grants that I cited above explaining some of the details of USAID’s work with the prefects are from USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Reports from 2006. Click here for information on activities in Pando and other prefects. Click here for information on activities in Santa Cruz, Pando, and other prefects.)
2). Some of these people have since actively encouraged violence by others (such as Costas, Marinkovic), and there is evidence that Fernandez, at least, coordinated campaigns of violence in September 2008. In Fernandez’s case, an international commission stated, after investigation, that he was the leader of such a coordinated campaign of violence, one that resulted in a “massacre.”
3). We do not know whether the U.S. has broken off its financial and other partnerships (i.e. such as training and networking activities) with these people, because USAID is not complying with FOIA requests, despite that it is not supposed to be a clandestine organization.
4). The burden of proof is on the U.S. to demonstrate that it has stopped any support for these people, in light of their actions during the September 2008 violence, and/or any other violent activities.
In addition, the U.S. clearly did nothing to make the Bolivian government – or the international community – think at the time that it was going to break off these relationships, or that it opposed these people’s activities, when it failed to condemn the violence in September, and when the U.S. Ambassador was caught by a TV journalist going to a private meeting with Ruben Costas. (I would argue that it was unwise, as Dan Moriarty says, for Goldberg to meet with Costas at all in this manner, in the midst of a wave of violence that Costas at the time was loudly defending and encouraging in public statements, and only weeks after he had publicly called Morales “a monkey.”)
This actually understates the U.S.’ connection to violent groups in Bolivia, since as I also noted above, the NED made grants to CAINCO in 2004 despite knowing of CAINCO’s connections to extremists such as the “Camba Nation”. (See my comment in response to the NED in the above entry.)
In response to Dan’s comments on the nature of USAID activities in collaboration with prefectures in Bolivia, USAID’s own reports suggest these were considerable projects – e.g., “OTI is now implementing projects in coordination with all nine departmental governments, most recently collaborating with the prefectures of Beni, Pando, and Oruro. OTI has approved 77 grants for $2.9 million to help departmental governments operate more strategically, improve service delivery and outreach to both urban and rural indigenous communities, and help prefects become successful promoters of regional economic development.”
We do not know the full extent of these or other projects. Also, money is fungible. It’s possible that some of the recipients of USAID assistance in these and other projects did not simply use these funds for technical training and support and the like. That’s why it is important for USAID and other U.S. government agencies (and the NED) to be careful not to partner with anyone who’s shown a proclivity towards violence or hatred.
Perhaps the U.S. has ended all funding and partnerships with these people. That would be great. The way to demonstrate this is with transparency. Anyone who is interested in knowing whether U.S. support for violent extremists in Bolivia continues should do as we did and call on USAID – and other government agencies, as Dan points out - to comply with FOIA requests and reveal whom they are funding in Bolivia and why. (Whether or not USAID is “currently the epicenter of US involvement in Bolivia aimed at countering or destabilizing the Morales government,” as Dan put it, I suppose we cannot be sure, but USAID’s spending in Bolivia is, relative to Bolivia’s economy, equivalent to what the U.S. spends on the Iraq war.) We might not be having this debate over whether there is sufficient evidence to support my assertion that there is “growing evidence, amid official secrecy, of U.S. funding for violent opposition groups” if USAID and other U.S. government agencies would comply with the many FOIA requests that have been filed over the past several years. Keep in mind that Jeremy Bigwood has sued for access to documents he requested through FOIA’s years ago, but which USAID refuses to release.
Some of the comments have suggested I’m making accusations or insinuations that I’m not. My points in my note to Jim, as posted above, are simply this:
1). The U.S. government has given funds to, and worked with, people such as Leopoldo Fernandez and Ruben Costas in the past. (Highlights of grants that I cited above explaining some of the details of USAID’s work with the prefects are from USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Reports from 2006. Click here for information on activities in Pando and other prefects. Click here for information on activities in Santa Cruz, Pando, and other prefects.)
2). Some of these people have since actively encouraged violence by others (such as Costas, Marinkovic), and there is evidence that Fernandez, at least, coordinated campaigns of violence in September 2008. In Fernandez’s case, an international commission stated, after investigation, that he was the leader of such a coordinated campaign of violence, one that resulted in a “massacre.”
3). We do not know whether the U.S. has broken off its financial and other partnerships (i.e. such as training and networking activities) with these people, because USAID is not complying with FOIA requests, despite that it is not supposed to be a clandestine organization.
4). The burden of proof is on the U.S. to demonstrate that it has stopped any support for these people, in light of their actions during the September 2008 violence, and/or any other violent activities.
In addition, the U.S. clearly did nothing to make the Bolivian government – or the international community – think at the time that it was going to break off these relationships, or that it opposed these people’s activities, when it failed to condemn the violence in September, and when the U.S. Ambassador was caught by a TV journalist going to a private meeting with Ruben Costas. (I would argue that it was unwise, as Dan Moriarty says, for Goldberg to meet with Costas at all in this manner, in the midst of a wave of violence that Costas at the time was loudly defending and encouraging in public statements, and only weeks after he had publicly called Morales “a monkey.”)
This actually understates the U.S.’ connection to violent groups in Bolivia, since as I also noted above, the NED made grants to CAINCO in 2004 despite knowing of CAINCO’s connections to extremists such as the “Camba Nation”. (See my comment in response to the NED in the above entry.)
In response to Dan’s comments on the nature of USAID activities in collaboration with prefectures in Bolivia, USAID’s own reports suggest these were considerable projects – e.g., “OTI is now implementing projects in coordination with all nine departmental governments, most recently collaborating with the prefectures of Beni, Pando, and Oruro. OTI has approved 77 grants for $2.9 million to help departmental governments operate more strategically, improve service delivery and outreach to both urban and rural indigenous communities, and help prefects become successful promoters of regional economic development.”
We do not know the full extent of these or other projects. Also, money is fungible. It’s possible that some of the recipients of USAID assistance in these and other projects did not simply use these funds for technical training and support and the like. That’s why it is important for USAID and other U.S. government agencies (and the NED) to be careful not to partner with anyone who’s shown a proclivity towards violence or hatred.
Perhaps the U.S. has ended all funding and partnerships with these people. That would be great. The way to demonstrate this is with transparency. Anyone who is interested in knowing whether U.S. support for violent extremists in Bolivia continues should do as we did and call on USAID – and other government agencies, as Dan points out - to comply with FOIA requests and reveal whom they are funding in Bolivia and why. (Whether or not USAID is “currently the epicenter of US involvement in Bolivia aimed at countering or destabilizing the Morales government,” as Dan put it, I suppose we cannot be sure, but USAID’s spending in Bolivia is, relative to Bolivia’s economy, equivalent to what the U.S. spends on the Iraq war.) We might not be having this debate over whether there is sufficient evidence to support my assertion that there is “growing evidence, amid official secrecy, of U.S. funding for violent opposition groups” if USAID and other U.S. government agencies would comply with the many FOIA requests that have been filed over the past several years. Keep in mind that Jeremy Bigwood has sued for access to documents he requested through FOIA’s years ago, but which USAID refuses to release.
It’s disappointing that unlike the NED, the U.S. Embassy has not chosen to respond to Jim’s invitation to debate these points, and help shed light on the nature of U.S. activities in Bolivia. I hope this is not another indication of official silence on this matter.
posted by The Democracy Center at 9:47 PM
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32 Comments:
I don't understand some issues:
I assume by your omission that the U.S. has directed NO funds to the heavily MAS controlled department of La Paz and the city of El Alto?
Why was it considered horrible if a U.S. ambassador met with the democratically elected leader of Santa Cruz?
Fernandez is being investigated but who is investigating the murders of the citizens of Sucre by MAS supporters (who were bused in from El Alto to Sucre) during the Constitutional Assembly?
Who is investigating the Venezuelan airplanes landing in Beni giving money to MAS supporters?
I'm not sure who is considered a "respectable" leader in Boliva (opposition or MAS)?
At least we are allowed to discuss things like this in the international community. Bolivia has restricted the domestic press more than any other Bolivian leader since the 1980's.
Jim posted: "I am inviting both the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and the NED to draft any response they would be willing to offer on this topic and have offered to publish it here, unedited"
Anon 11:44PM's comment is the first response by the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and the NED. The usual suspects will post the balance of responses, filled with more of the same old same old: falsehoods; misleading statements; ad hominems and opinions disguised as facts; and pablum designed to obfusticate and frustrate readers from reading further in their usual manner (i.e., "... The Croats are Evos Jews").
Case in point:
1) "Bolivia has restricted the domestic press more than any other Bolivian leader since the 1980's." If ever there were a case of biased coverage and a political agenda that promotes the opposition's talking points that even surpasses the Fox network in the U.S. it is El Deber and the "domestic press" which function as pamphleteers for the overthrow of Bolivia's democratically elected government.
2) "Who is investigating the Venezuelan airplanes landing in Beni giving money to MAS supporters?" Assumes facts not supported by any evidence; just more disinformation directed by the Bush-Cheney holdovers in the US State Dept that remain because of the negligence of the Multi-tasker=in-Chief, Obama.
3)"Why was it considered horrible if a U.S. ambassador met with the democratically elected leader of Santa Cruz?"
Why, because Santa Cruz is not a sovereign. Instead, it was the stronghold of the rebel forces terrorizing Eastern Bolivia at the time and Goldberg met with the rebel terroristic leaders. Once Goldberg was expelled, the rule of law returned and order restored since Goldberg could no longer fund or direct the Kosovoification of Bolivia. Further, Branko was not a "democratically elected leader".
In response to "El Grindio" comment at 2:21am:
1) The following link from the Miami Herald:
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/story/1034167.html
basically states that the press in Bolivia is severely restricted.
2) The following link (which includes reputable links to its sources):
http://gatewaypundit.blogspot.com/2008/01/chavista-money-man-busted-after-plane.html
has information regarding Venezuela providing funds to Bolivia (similar to Argentina).
3) According to the link in the above article by Dan Beeton, Phillip Goldberg had a meeting with Ruben Costas (the Governor of Santa Cruz) not Branko Marinkovic.
But you are very correct in saying that "The usual suspects will post the balance of responses, filled with more of the same old same old: falsehoods; misleading statements; ad hominems and opinions disguised as facts; and pablum designed to obfusticate and frustrate readers from reading further in their usual manner..." as you have well proven.
Jim, it would have been more interesting would you have started your fictional article more Poe like: "Once upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered weak and weary (in a seedy motel in Cochabamba trying my shake at fiction..." bla bla bla.
Same old, same old. No proof, evidence, nor corroboration. Just hearsay, innunedo, and typical lefty contradictions. Your little caveat "...of course I'm not suggesting that the U.S. is funding the UJC, the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, or any similar such groups directly. And I'm not saying there's evidence that the U.S. gave money to people like Fernandez to be used for violent ends" is weak and only magnifies the trashy tabloid-like speculative title of your article.
Cuchi Cuchi worshipper, a la George Bush, now wants to be known as the "antiterrorism president," which he's using as an excuse to intensify his witchhunt against the opposition. This despite the fact that there is zero, zip, nada proof of any intent of toppling his government; and that his government is handling this "investigation" in the most atrociously unprofessional manner, which includes extortion, torture, and false accusations by part of the government to witnesses/individuals it doesn't like.
Just as Hitler invented excuses to get rid of the Jews, now Cuchi Cuchi worshipper has his "terrorist" excuse to get rid of the Coolest Cats in the Collasuyo...the Croats.
;-)
The Croats are Morales' Jews
Beni is Morales' Katrina
I think Evo has de-volved from being a copycat of Bush II to now being a full blown McCarthy using accusations to bully the opposition. I'm no fan of the "Civicos," but even them deserve a due process and rather than incite mob justice, Evo should put them on trial.
Now again, the only thing I gather from the article above is that the US intelligence aparatus is in a very sorry state. Imagine having to ask Peace Corps tree huggers for intel. However, more pathetic is the how the author concludes that monies being given to a prefecture is being funneled to anti-evo opposition. This level of idiocy only rivals Eva Gonlier (sp?) who used an email from USAID that stated that they wanted to create moderate indigenous movements as evidence of a brewing holocaust in Bolivia.
As I posted before, there is 0 evidence that the US is acting in the way Evo and people like Grindio would want you to believe. I have no lost love for USAID, I believe more than helping the poor, they are simply a channel to give subsidies to US companies to get a profitable foothold in developing countries. Nothing nefarious about that...other than going against the free market and fair competition ideals. If anything, USAID should do the opposite and give those subsidies to local companies to create industries.
Regardless, I'm having a bit of dilema this morning. Mr Kiffer (the SU$2MM+ beechcraft guy) died and a lot of people are telling that I'm a terrible person for not being sorry for him. Some got upset when I replied that they should use the wake and funeral to arrest his family members and friends in order to try to find the missing money. I mean, sure we overlook shortcommings of people when they die, but this guy? I mean he stole money that was intended for people that had lost everything, why is it so wrong to ask for a little justice?
Anon 3:57AM
"Phillip Goldberg had a meeting with Ruben Costas (the Governor of Santa Cruz) not Branko Marinkovic."
You can't be serious. If you currently live or have lived in Santa Cruz Bolivia you will know that Costas, Marinkovic, etc all one good ole boys club. To think that Marinkovic wasn't well briefed on everything at the meeting and took part on any decisions is not being realistic.
Dan Beeton is spot on when he states:
"- to make clear to readers that there sometimes isn't much difference between the "respectable" opposition figures like Marinkovic and some of the prefects, and the UJC and their ilk"
There really is very little difference between all these characters. They all know each other very well and are interconnected and act in concert. From the top down. Everyone in the city knows it, and increasingly everyone in the outside is realizing it.
Who funds Achas Human Rights Foundation (US grants?) Why should we take them seriously when the president in Bolivia, Hugo Acha, conveniently fled the country a few days after Flores and his goons were caught. How biased can you be. I read in another forum that the secretary general in Bolivia is Aleandra Barbery. She's on Nacion Cambas facebook group as a member. LOL 2+2=4
It's hard not to feel sorry for Kieffer, who was one of the country's most infamous politicians in the 90s. 2 reasons why he deserves pity: the amount of money he allegedly stole was peanuts compared to other big negociados and especially the nationalization corruption/32 smuggling camions with Evo.The other reason is that he suffered from cancer for months before he died. That's enough painful suffering.
10;31am
I think you meant Alejandra Barbery, and yup just searched on google and sure enough she lists nacion camba as a group she's joined.
Ive personally been in touch with people in Argentina that sold one of the milk processing plants to Evo, and they told me that when they were about to get the contract to build the other 11 plants, they were asked for a bribe, they obviously said no and that is why they are only finishing the first one in pucarani while the rest were bought from IRAN hahahahahahaa what a joke what does IRAN know about the dairy indsutry? NOTHING compared to argentina. While dumbasses like jim are worried about stirring up any form of anti evo conspiracy, they conviniently never find out about all the GIANORMOUS amount of corruption in the current govt. I honestly want to know when jim will consider writing something truly bad about evo.
I personally saw Evo Morales kill a baby and eat its head. Trust me, I'm anonymous.
I don't know anything about the general reliability of CEPR or the solidity of the NACLA Reporter, but if Dan Beeton's response to Jim reflects his thinking and the 'evidence' it is based on, I can't swallow enough salt to make it even resemble responsible journalism. In fact, it is shot through with innuendo, exaggeration and basic logic flaws, and is, in my humble opinion, little more than a ideological hatchet job.
First a preface, and then some examples. First, I think that Reuben Costas may be one of the two men most dangerous to Bolivian unity today - the other is Alvaro Garcia Linares, but that's another story. Second, while a long-time observer of Bolivian affairs, I almost never am moved to respond to a blog - unlike 'Croats", whose postings I no longer bother to read. I'm also appearing as anonymous in this posting, as I'm a little confused about how to show a name without providing my email address to all the wingnuts out there. So, my apology.
Now to the examples of exaggeration, etc.:
"U.S. has already funded violent actors among the Bolivian opposition" ". . . millions of dollars in aid to departmental prefects and municipal governments in Bolivia."
When I followed the links to these statements, the links don't appear to support these assertions. The only Prefecturas specifically mentioned in the USAID publications are Potosi and Oruro, hardly opposition hotbeds. The statements also make the innuendo that providing funds (did USAID provide funds directly to the prefecturas, or to U.S. grantees to carry out their activities?)for activities in a Departament was equivalent to funding violence.
"We know that Leopoldo Fernandez, as a prefect, received some of this money." "We also know that USAID has similarly funded and worked with Ruben Costas in his capacity as prefect of Santa Cruz."
These statements beg the question of whether Costas directly received and had control over the funds. Beeson is silent on this point. And he again makes the innuendo that "working" with Costas makes the U.S. complicit in political violence in Santa Cruz.
"Was Phillip Goldberg really surprised to be expelled after being caught having a clandestine meeting with this man (Costas)?"
After looking at the linked video, it appears that the meeting was anything but clandestine, as it was widely reported in the Bolivian press. Sure, it was private, but what ambassador to the U.S. opens the doors to every meeting he has with a U.S. state governor? Once again, unsupported innuendo that something sinister happened during the meeting.
"I noted some of the prefects' encouragement of the September violence and sabotage in my article, citing AFP 'the conservative governors are encouraging protesters in their actions' and 'militants linked to the opposition group set up roadblocks to add pressure to the governors' demands for more control over gas revenues'."
So roadblocks and sabotage are not legitimate forms of protest in Bolivia? Perhaps Mr. Beeton is not aware that roadblocks and sabotage were virtually invented by the current government's leaders as forms of political action.
" . . . rightwing Podemos Party"
Unfortunate use of the freighted term "rightwing" to describe a group that would be better described as "centrist" or "conservative".
"Funding of anyone in Conalde is the same as the funding of violent groups when they're the ones coordinating campaigns of violence"
Again begs the question "What's the proof that they are, in fact, guilty of coordinating campaigns of violence?" Without such proof, this statement by the author is breathtaking in its irresponsibility.
"So, in short, of course I'm not suggesting that the U.S. is funding [opposition] groups directly, etc., etc.."
You aren't? It surely seems so throughout your missive. After paragraphs of innuendo and unsupported allegations, this last step back just doesn't cut it. But it does call to mind a serious flaw of logic I learned about in school many years ago. It's called 'Post hoc ergo propter hoc'. Roughly translated, for the unwashed among you, it means that just because one event follows another, it doesn't mean that the first event caused the second. To allege that it did, without further proof, is like saying "The elephants don't come because I keep clapping my hands". This is the common flaw throughout Beeton's missive. It may be that the U.S. has funded political violence in Bolivia, but to make the bland assertion that "… growing evidence, amid official secrecy, of U.S. funding for violent opposition groups.", without providing at least a single piece of hard evidence is bad journalism and is utterly irresponsible.
Whether anonymous' claim is correct or not, is all mid-level corruption Evo's fault? What if instead of trying to overthrow the government, or secede, or paint the government as authoritarian, the local press did its job and uncovered these type of issues?
The issue with Costas' meeting with Goldberg is that it was a CLANDESTINE meeting, hidden from the public and would not have been discovered were it not for some intrepid journalists obtaining the footage, available at youtube link above.
While foreigners may not understand Bolivia's political organization, and that a foreign agent has no business meeting with the Prefect of one region of the UNITARY national state, they should be able to grasp that this meeting was under-cover for some shady reasons, and that this ocurred at the same time that Costas' sympathizers in the UJC and Nacion Camba were literally beating up brown skinned Bolivians with bats and driving around in jeeps with Nazi symbols painted on them.
The unfunny and sad reality is that many of those UJC and Nacion Camba members are unrecognizably different from those they hate so much. I must hand it to Nacion Camba and their leaders they've done a wonderful job of propaganda and brain washing, Goebbels would be proud.
Their funny looking uniforms, propaganda pamphlets, and rhetoric have done wonders so far with normal citizens. Those idiots once accused me of being an indian sympathizer, as if that was such a bad thing, when I actually confronted them at the plaza. My wife laughed all night because the guy was four foot nothing and could pass for Morales' cousin. I was just a dumb liberal European tourist who didn't understand the camba "race".
Why do these people hate themselves so much?
After reading Jim's post I really don't know whether to laugh or cry. Of all the things I'd like to set straight, I'll just limit to one: Jeremy Bigwood's superb job uncovering that the NED had funded CAINCO was really not necessary. It was on the NED's website!!! I guess it doesn't take much of a genius to uncover that.
Well said Anonymous 6:40pm. You did a great job pointing all the weaknesses, sometimes fabrications and definitely exaggerated relations that Beeton describes in his response.
I am glad there are people calling him on it... CEPR looks like a reputable organization, and I am hoping his comments are for personal attribution and he is not speaking on behalf of CEPR.
Well, as Forrest Gump used to say (and whose IQ is higher than most of who participate in this blog): "Life is like a box of chocolates: ya never know whatcha gonna get."
Cuchi Cuchi worshipper and his band of monolito lovers are engaged in so many gaffes and acts of corruption that cover such a wide variety of issues that it is only fair to compare them as chocolates in a huge chocolate box.
3 new "chocolates" to consider from Morales' huge chocolate box (cesspool of racism and corruption):
-Chocolate #1: The state TV channel, ENTB, taken over by Cuchi Cuchi worshipper's strongman Quintana to promote his policies a la Goebbels, just declared bankruptcy, with a balance in the red of 56,000,000 Bs. (Kieffer, so much hated by lefties and who apparently had a close connection with Quintana, made peanuts compared to this guy)
-Chocolate #2: Cuchi Cuchi worshipper's MAS puppets in the Legislative free Quintana from his role in the now infamous 33 trucks with smuggled goods. The final report, which is riddled with selective and made up facts, was cooked up solely by MAS goons. No oversight, no corroboration, nothing. In a shining example of the toilet paper constitution's concept of justice, the whistleblower himself is accused of being the bad guy.
-Chocolate #3: The prosecutor in charge of the (pause for laughter) "investigation" of the 3 assassinated "terrorists," so eager to talk to the public before, is now curiously silent. Is it because the more he talked, the more the atmosphere around him stank? Or is it because he's being investigated for 8 felonies, one that includes rape?
As the wise Kjarkas would sing:
Wayayayayayayayayay, wayayay.
Wayayayayayayayayay, wayayay.
;-)
The Croats are Morales' Jews
Beni is Morales' Katrina
I did a good bit of research on this topic with some of the staff of the Democracy Center last year. Reading Mr. Beeton’s article here, my first observations are regarding one of the key paragraphs:
"And I'm not saying there's evidence that the U.S. gave money to people like Fernandez to be used for violent ends. But they've nevertheless given money to prefects like Fernandez, Costas and other actors who have conspired to commit violence and have encouraged violence when it occurred, and who in all likelihood passed money on to the guys with baseball bats and guns."
and the later sentence, from his concluding paragraph: "Whether or not all the grant recipients "need" this money from the U.S., I don't know, but the fact is that departmental and municipal governments have been receiving it."
Two things I'd question.
One: It is my understanding, from our research, that AID does not give money to the prefectures. They offer technical assistance -- computer programs, training, etc. The officials with whom we met were adamant on this point, and it even seems to be reflected in Beeton's third paragraph, about OTI (which no longer exists in Bolivia). So, I would say he needs to at least add to his argument the idea that, assuming the prefectures would, in the absence of these USAID funds/projects, spend their own money to do the same things (personally, I wouldn't assume that), then the USAID projects free up those funds to be used on other things, some of which he argues are no doubt violent acts against the government. Which points to...
Two: It seems a reach to simply say that the prefects "in all likelihood passed (US) money on to the guys with baseball bats and guns." In addition to the above-outlined fact that I don’t think they had US cash on hand that they could have passed on (at least not from AID), one thing everyone has failed to turn up is direct evidence of this kind of hand-off of money to shock troops. Even when Evo's people took over the prefecture in Cochabamba from political opponent Manfred Reyes Villa (who was ousted in a recall election) and went through the books with a fine-toothed comb, they never came up with anything suggesting what many people, myself included, have always assumed - that the prefecture was materially behind the violence of Januay 11, 2007. Perhaps the books were cooked. Perhaps Manfred and friends funded things out-of-pocket. Perhaps we're wrong all together. But the point is that a statement such as the one quoted above is ultimately conjecture.
I think Beeton is right in pointing to the connections between all of these top opposition figures and the violent groups. I think it is true that by supporting the prefectures, USAID supports the prefects, which in turn ultimately, if indirectly, strengthens them in their antigovernment activities. His points about Costas' connections to violence and racism are good ones, and he's right to point out that Goldberg's meeting with Costas was problematic whatever they discussed. But I think even in his response to Jim’s request for evidence, he goes further than a responsible researcher or journalist should in concluding direct money links, via local government leaders, between the Embassy and violence in the streets.
Another point worth making: USAID's support for "decentralization," as far as we could see in our research, refers to the decentralization that already took place under Sanchez de Lozada, supported by the MAS, with the direct election of prefects, etc. This emphasis in USAID's work is actually in response to the Morales administration's plan for development, which specifically names the strengthening of local governments as a priority. In terms of the debates over autonomy and money, I would connect this point to the irony that even as the prefects were making a huge public stink over the diversion of IDH funds (money the government makes from hydrocarbon sales) from prefectures to the Bono Dignidad (monthly social security-type payments to the elderly), they were unable to spend much of the money they were already being given (and even with Bono Dignidad, prefectures were slated to receive increased funds - the increases would just be smaller than originally projected). Their inability to spend the money they were receiving was due to their poor administrative capacities and the lack of internal structures for carrying out the kinds of projects now under the perview of newly empowered departmental governments (prefectures). The Morales administration recognizes this weakness as a problem, and the USAID programs aimed at "support of the decentralization process" are intended to address this problem. They are not, from what we could see, related to political action toward the kind of departmental autonomy reflected in the "statutes" of Santa Cruz and other opposition-led departments (although I think the US likely does support such action, at least in theory).
Finally, I think we need to note that a lot of the most damning evidence on this issue is old. Much is pre-2005 elections. Beeton refers to 2006 reports from OTI (USAID’s controversial Office of Transition Initiatives), an office that left Bolivia shortly thereafter. Now, my hunch is that many researchers interested in US political activity in Bolivia may be making a mistake by taking Morales' lead in focusing on USAID (and, by extension, NED). While USAID has an ugly history here going back decades, and was definitely politically motivated in some of its work here at least into 2006 and possibly 2007, I am not convinced that they are currently the epicenter of US involvement in Bolivia aimed at countering or destabilizing the Morales government. I think the US government has learned that USAID has made itself vulnerable, perhaps more quickly than their watchdogs have, and has adjusted accordingly. I'd still like to see even more transparency regarding AID, etc., but I think they are one of the most transparent of the agencies working here (I found documentation of their 1960s program to train and run paramilitary bombers in Uruguay and elsewhere on the USAID website, for crying out loud), and I suspect not much more will come to light regarding their complicity in Bolivia’s recent and ongoing violence, etc.
At the beginning of our research we discussed all the myriad ways in which the US supports political activity in Bolivia. I don't recall all the details, but we even heard about surprisingly political programs through agencies such as the US Department of Agriculture (which in turn points to a friend’s observation that major US agro-business, including chemical manufacturers, etc., are heavily invested in the status quo of Santa Cruz farming, and would be much harder to nail down than are government agencies in terms of any support they might be offering to political groups here). And of course, old bogey-men like the CIA are still real and are presumably still here. I'm reminded of the story of the man found on his hands and knees under a street lamp who says he's looking for his keys. Asked if he lost them where he's looking, he points to some dark bushes down the way and says, "No, I lost them over there, but the light is better here." I don't want to be naive about US meddling in Bolivia. There may well be a degree of inappropriate involvement (although I agree with the point Jim has made several times, that this is ultimately a homegrown conflict that doesn't need to be created/stoked by the US). But I'm not convinced it's through USAID.
Meanwhile, there is a new administration in the US, and while I'm not 100% encouraged by the signs they've given regarding their approach to Latin America (Goni’s lawyer is White House Counsel – nuff said), I think there have been encouraging moments (including this, from the very same CEPR for which Mr. Beeton writes: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/may/05/obama-clinton-latin-america), and I definitely would not assume that everything Bush did, Obama will continue to do.
(PS: I will cross-post this at my own blog, danmoriarty.blogspot.com)
Writing anti-Evo opinion articles is hardly evidence of the US backing opposition forces. Lots of people write anti-Evo opinion articles all over the world. Or is having an anti-Evo opinion a crime now? T'would seem so. Criminalizing opinions is anti-democratic. And Evo's government is anything but democratic.
"...he was found by the UNASUR commission that investigated the September violence in Porvenir to have led a "chain of command” of perpetrators who acted "in an organized fashion” to commit a "massacre."
We all know the UNASUR "commission" was completely partial and didn't even interview one single person from the opposition. That UNASUR commission was laughable. As was its report.
If you're going to cite USAID's help to the prefectures, let us count the projects ALSO funded by USAID, the European Union, Spanish Cooperation, GTZ German Agency for Cooperation, Japanese Cooperation, Venezuelan "cooperation", etc. etc. directed at pro-MAS groups and communities.
Millions of dollars given for projects carried out by NGOs such as CARE International for "political advocacy training" and "social mobilization training".
Projects such as
How a "democracy" center can support a government such as Evo's, a government that is ANYTHING other than democratic, is beyond me. Evo's government has no moral authority to speak of terrorism. The meeting last week to create an Anti-Terrorism Pact had me in tears.
First of all no one has taken the time to indicate how "terrorism" will be defined? Are 20,000 fully armed campesinos bearing down on Santa Cruz with dynamite in hand not also terrorism? Is blowing up the plaza in Montero with dynamite not terrorism? Is blocking the roads, beating up people, and holding the Fiscales who tried to unblock them hostage not terrorism? Is criminalizing and militarizing Santa Cruz without any evidence not psychological warfare and terrorism? Is stalking people's homes, calling them on their phones ("we know where your children are"), and following them not terrorism? Is surrounding the Congress to keep democratically elected opposition congresspeople from entering to place their votes and beating them in the streets not terrorism?
Let's take a minute to create a definition of terrorism that everyone can agree on - before we start throwing out accusations.
Give me freaking break!
Why was it considered horrible if a U.S. ambassador met with the democratically elected leader of Santa Cruz?
Fernandez is being investigated but who is investigating the murders of the citizens of Sucre by MAS supporters (who were bused in from El Alto to Sucre) during the Constitutional Assembly?
don't agree with all the points in his analysis, but I do hope that Dan Beeton's correspondence below will help provoke a solid and intelligent debate among our readers on this issue. In addition, I am inviting both the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and the NED to draft any response they would be willing to offer on this topic and have offered to publish it here..
will stay here for answer...
my blog:watch and world
Marabunta sez: The actual ignominy towards Morales being called an ape has blatant and profound connotations in past history, which will nonetheless be overwhelmed by popular consensus, in a fair electoral test.
Marabunta will abound: On the fact that it will be regular troops, which will from now on concentrate on borders, and that any and all objections to sovereign rule, in such respect, constitude an overt, and quite frank admission of malfeasance, as in most preceding posts. The voice of the people is indeed the voice of GOD, and there's no-can-do about it at all, anywhere in the planet.
The peace corp volunteers and the Fulbright scholar were never asked to SPY.... Stop spreading that Lie.
Get it straight.... they were asked to identify any unusual contact with Cubans or Venezuelans...
THAT is not SPYING... Although the Asst RSO who briefed them should not have asked them to do so.
Goldberg met with Costas in the open... They held a press conference right after ...you morons
Dan Beeton is correct that, despite transparency regarding the general allocation of funds, it is not always easy to figure out exactly how USAID money is actually spent in the end - especially given that there is so much of it in Bolivia.
An interesting note here, which gets back to my point about not taking the Bolivian government's lead in assuming USAID is at the center of US meddling in Bolivia: I originally began our research assuming that the Bolivian government had, as they claimed to have, some form of evidence to back up their claims of USAID support for the opposition. We were committed to talking with all sides and evaluating the evidence for ourselves, but I did think the Morales administration would at least happily cooperate with us, and provide us with evidence we could then present to USAID for comment. Instead, we got absolutely zero official cooperation from the Bolivian government. Officials were not allowed to speak about the issue without cabinet-level approval, and that approval never came, despite over a dozen requests.
Meanwhile, USAID was very open in talking with us, providing documents, and encouraged us to meet with the recipients of their grants, the people served by those agencies, etc. A difficulty we then ran into was figuring out which programs to dig into. Our first question to the Bolivian government was going to be exactly that: whom/what should we investigate? We never got to ask the question.
One argument US officials were unable to respond to, though, was that of indirect strengthening of opposition figures - even potentially violent ones. The example given was, again, Cochabamba's Manfred Reyes Villa. I pointed out that the then-prefect (who may or may not have backed the bat-wielding, murdering throngs of "youth for democracy" on January 11, 2007, but who absolutely, publicly called for a military coup against Morales) had built his political career on public works, and was working to position himself as a national opposition leader. I asked if co-sponsoring the prefecture's public works (while USAID wouldn't give cash to the prefectures, they would spend money on projects -- e.g. bridge-building, etc. -- on which the prefecture was also spending money) wasn't ultimately strengthening his political position. They admitted it could be, but that they figured the value of the projects themselves outweighed any political unease they might cause. A cynic might point out that this is particularly true if the political effects of the projects, uneasy as they might make things diplomatically, are actually part of the reason the projects exist in the first place.
Another example of insensitivity (or calculated political maneuvering, but I'm in a generous mood) on the part of AID is in programs aimed at strengthening political parties. Even if all the money of these programs was spent as claimed, on things like improving transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to issues of poverty, the problem is that such programs were being carried out at a time when a majority of Bolivians were rejecting the traditional party model and the traditional parties themselves. Regardless of the myriad ways in which the MAS itself may fail, stumble, or replicate flawed systems (if not that of political parties, then perhaps that of Bolivian syndicalism), it was widely seen by voters as an alternative to the old, failed, revolving-door system of MNR/MIR/ADN-PODEMOS-controlled government. For the US to then jump in and attempt to bolster those parties seems impolitic at best, and aggressively political at worst.
I concluded that, given the sensitivities here and USAID's own history, the US ought to tread more lightly than it does. Almost everything is political. And the US has made it quite clear, particularly under Bush, that it views Morales' government and agenda as problematic, even anti-democratic. There is a lot of good work that the US can do to assist Bolivia in economic development and even related areas of justice and peace without getting involved in partisan politics here. They claim they don't. I think they may be sincere, but mistaken. Beeton is right that the US should avoid dealings with the kinds of leaders who have openly supported violent anti-government action.
Direct talks between USAID and the Bolivian government regarding the kinds of projects AID does here would be a good, obvious way to start. I also think that USAID could be more proactive by applying an overtly political lens to their own planning - one aimed not at advancing US political interests, but at better understanding the political landscape here so as to avoid the kind of firestorm in which it's found itself since 2007. A mix of actors - local, international, state and non-state - could participate, forming a kind of advisory or oversight committee for this process.
Naive? On the one hand, USAID exists to promote US interests and advance US foreign policy abroad, and history shows us that this is not always a good thing for Latin Americans. On the other hand, it is an agency made up of a lot of good, well-meaning people who are here to promote development (and we decided, in our research, not even to get into the massive, different-but-related debate about appropriate models of development, or even the very concept of "development"), to be friends to the people of Bolivia in a way that is apolitical/nonpartisan. I think vigilance is always warranted, but I'm hopeful that progress can be made.
There is also something to be said, given US history in the region, for an approach that focuses more on disengagement. What if suggestions aimed at de-politicizing USAID only serve to make its political maneuvering more stealthy? Why trust USAID at all? Let them leave. I think this may be a good approach for certain areas, such the Chapare with its history of "alternative development" programs bound up in the problematic US "war on drugs."
But the flipside to why the Morales government only kicked USAID out of that one region is because the government finds so much of what USAID does here desirable. Even in the area of "democracy building," MAS officials and MAS-led agencies participate in and benefit from all kinds of USAID projects. There is a certain "Mexican stand-off" quality to the public squabble between the Morales government and USAID, as Morales boldly states that USAID is free to leave whenever they want to (but doesn't kick them out), and USAID replies that Morales is free to kick them out (but they don't leave). Another film-inspired analogy would be that of a disfunctional couple in a hackneyed romantic comedy. "I'm leaving!" "Fine, go!" "I will!" "So go then!" In the end, while these two may not always end up embracing, they can't seem to walk away from the fight. Call it love, or call it co-dependency, but they seem to need each other.
check this:
http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/entrev-reportajes/index.php?ckl=268
There is no need to be a genius to come to the conclusion that there was a real conspiracy against Morales (and still there is). For those who still have douts should visit the link provided above where you can find information about documentation found on USAID activities in Bolivia.
Everything fits in its place. The embassador Goldberg, Usaid, and now HRF is involved in what is clear the real perpetrator of terrorism in Bolivia was and problably is the CIA under the direction of the US government.
At least they are upfront about funding and source. Plus theydon't take money from Soros - what's your story. Now some disclosure from JIM?
'The U.S. Embassy and organizations such as USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) insist that they are merely supporting efforts to strengthen government administration.'
This is total BULL.What are they even doing in Bolivia or Venezuela? ONly a nitwit would believe them when they say: we are merely trying to strengthe govt admin! Thye will keep lying like this so long as they have a willing audience for their lies.
Brian
Is the US funding violent opposition groups?
'Strengthening political parties in the opposition
Another principal priority of USAID in Bolivia as outlined in the declassified documents is the extensive funding and training of oppositional political parties. Through two US entities, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI), both considered international branches of the republican and democrat parties in the US that receive their funding from the Department of State and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID has been feeding – with funding and strategic political aide – political groups and leaders from the opposition in Bolivia. During the year 2007, $1.250.000.00 was dedicated to “training for members of political parties on current political and electoral processes, including the constituent assembly and the referendum on autonomy.” The principal beneficiaries of this funding have been the opposition political parties Podemos, MNR, MIR and more than 100 politically-oriented NGOs in Bolivia.'
http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2009/05/newly-declassified-documents-reveal.html
The US anmbassador met with those violent oposition groups before they did their violence....NED can deny it all they like..But the idea they are there just to aid government is pur bull.
Brian
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